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Reform of the Frontex regulationOperation Sophia European Parliament elections
This policy update’s Special Focus covers the 
extension of Operation Sophia without  naval assets, 
which raises questions regarding the future of 
Search and Rescue (SAR) activities in the 
Mediterranean and has been strongly condemned by 
civil society organisations. NGO SAR activities 
continue to be blocked and migrants are stranded on 
boats, barred from docking at European harbours. 
With the EU further decreasing its involvement in 
SAR activities and member states unable to share 
responsibility for migrants, crossing the 
Mediterranean is likely to become ever more 
dangerous.
At the same time, the EU is intensifying its relations 
with North African countries with the aim of 
enhancing control over migration. The contentious 
League of Arab States-EU summit of late February 
can be seen as a recalibration of EU foreign policy 
towards prioritising migration management in its 
 
relations with non-EU countries. This is controversial 
among African states, as a leaked position paper from the 
African Union on the topic of disembarkation platforms 
shows.
The EU’s increasing focus on migration control and border 
management also transpires from the agreement reached 
on the reform of the European Border and Coast Guard, or 
Frontex. Measures include a strengthened body of 10,000 
border guards as well as an expanded role for Frontex to 
conduct operations in third countries. Civil society 
organisations have expressed concerns about these 
developments.
In the meantime, the European Parliament elections at the 
end of May are drawing nearer. In the Closer Look section, 
the European Council on Refugees and Exiles describes 
their campaign #YourVoteOurFuture. The campaign aims to 
mobilise progressive Europeans who are already engaged 
in the work for and with refugees and migrants.
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 SPECIAL FOCUS 
  Scaled down Operation Sophia endangers SAR ​.  
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Immigration Detention ​. 
This Special Focus analyses the extension of Operation Sophia’s mandate and how the                         
downscaling of the mission and the discontinuation of naval support affect the situation in                           
the Mediterranean. In light of the ongoing criminalisation of NGOs conducting Search and                         
Rescue (SAR) missions and the increasingly volatile political situation in Libya, the                       
withdrawal of EU naval assets exacerbates the risks already faced by migrants attempting                         
to cross the Mediterranean Sea. 
  
At the end of March, the ​EU Council agreed to extend the mandate of EUNAVFOR MED,                               
commonly known as ‘Operation Sophia’, until September 2019. The official mandate of the                         
operation will continue to be the disruption of the ‘business model’ of migrant smugglers in                             
the south-central Mediterranean. However, the deployment of naval assets will be                     
suspended for the duration of the extension, a decision which has been criticised by the EU                               
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High Representative for Foreign Affairs, ​Federica Mogherini​. According to the agreement,                     
Operation Sophia will only use air patrols to search and identify vessels. The end of naval                               
support means that the mission will from now on depend on closer collaboration with the                             
Libyan Coast Guard to conduct maritime operations, including SAR. Support to the Libyan                         
Coast Guard will be reinforced through enhanced monitoring and training, as stipulated by                         
the extended mandate. The downscaling of Operation Sophia is the result of the inability of                             
member states to resolve the disagreement over the ​ambiguous nature of the mission, which                           
could be seen as an instrument for curbing migration or as a tool for saving lives. Despite its                                   
official mandate to deter human trafficking networks, Operation Sophia was ​launched in                       
June 2015 following a series of tragic shipwrecks. All ships, including those that operated                           
under the mission, are obliged under international law to respond to emergency calls sent                           
by other vessels and to rescue those in distress at sea. Between 2015 and 2018, ​naval                               
operations conducted as part of Operation Sophia reportedly saved more than 49,000 people                         
trying to cross the Mediterranean. Over time, however, member states split over the formal                           
anti-smuggling mandate and the de facto extension of the mission’s activities to SAR. 
 
When the new Italian government took office in March 2018, the coalition of states                           
participating in Operation Sophia engaged in an argument over where to disembark those                         
saved and which state should be responsible for rescued migrants applying for asylum.                         
Most migrants saved while Operation Sophia was ongoing, were disembarked in Italy,                       
which, in most cases, was both the nearest port of safety and the rescue centre coordinating                               
SAR activities. Upon taking office, Italy’s interior minister, Matteo Salvini, accused the EU of                           
placing an ​unfair burden on his country. Italy refused disembarkation unless other member                         
states also started taking in rescued migrants through ​a relocation mechanism​. This is also                           
connected to the inability of member states to agree on a ​corrective fairness mechanism to                             
the Dublin regulation and on the ​reform of the Common European Asylum System more                           
generally. The ​unresolved conflict between participating member states gave way to the                       
disputed​ practice of​ ​ad hoc relocation​ ​arrangements.  
 
The Operation’s ​naval assets were ​crucial for SAR missions. The implications of the                         
downscaling for the safety of those attempting the dangerous sea crossing could be                         
disastrous, especially in the context of the simultaneous criminalisation of NGOs. In this                         
respect, it is ​noteworthy ​that the Italian defence ministry issued a ​directive restraining civil                           
rescue operations while negotiations to extend the full mandate of Operation Sophia were                         
falling through. The Italian directive mandates all ships participating in rescue missions to                         
follow the instructions of the competent centre for a given SAR area - ​controversially​, also                             
Libya - and it specifies that rescue ships that do not comply with the regulation will be                                 
sanctioned accordingly. The directive produced an immediate effect as the crew of the                         
Italian ship ​Mare Jonio​, which headed towards Lampedusa after rescuing fifty migrants off                         
the coast of Libya, were charged with ‘facilitating illegal migration’, a criminal act under                           
Italian law. 
  
After the NGO ‘Mediterranea’ announced in mid-April that Mare Jonio had set sails for a                             
new ​rescue mission​, the Italian government issued a ​second directive explicitly ​targeting ​its                         
activities. The criminalisation of humanitarian operations is causing a deterrent effect, as                       
was discussed at the ​LIBE Committee meeting of early April 2019. Ships are blocked in                             
European ports or are stuck in international waters for weeks, as exemplified by the                           
situation of the blockaded rescue ship ‘​Alan Kurdi​’. After Italy refused to disembark all but                             
the ​mothers and children on board, the ship of the NGO ‘Sea Eye’ was stationed for days                                 
outside the Maltese territorial waters, and living conditions ​became unsustainable for those                       
on board. At long last, the stranded people were able to ​disembark in Valletta and were then                                 
relocated from there to Germany, France, Portugal and Luxembourg. ​Crew members of the                         
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German NGO, however, were denied permission to come ashore, an act that the ​organisation                           
considers evidence of the government’s intention to further suppress their activities. 
  
Against this background, the suspension of naval missions of Operation Sophia puts the                         
lives of those who attempt to cross the Mediterranean Sea in real danger. The new mandate                               
means that, except for a few civilian ships resisting criminalising and restraining measures,                         
large parts of the Mediterranean Sea will not be monitored by vessels capable of promptly                             
engaging in rescue missions. ​In view of this, the ​Assistant Secretary General for Human                           
Rights of UNHCR has declared that restrictions on life-saving work of humanitarian                       
organisations should be lifted so that they are no longer “obliged to stand by, helplessly,                             
while human beings drown before their eyes”. The Council of Europe ​Commissioner for                         
Human Rights also issued a statement urging European countries to stop criminalising                       
NGOs that provide humanitarian aid. In spite of such pleas from the international                         
community and the ​evidence of acts of intimidation against NGOs, the European                       
Commission has not taken a firm position on the matter. 
  
Instead, the EU is relying ever more strongly on cooperation with the Libyan authorities for                             
monitoring movements across the Mediterranean Sea. Under the Operation’s new mandate,                     
EU air patrols should in principle report emergency situations to the Libyan Coast Guard.                           
Due to the recent ​escalation of violence in Libya and the ​rapidly deteriorating ​humanitarian                           
situation in the country, however, it remains to be seen if and under what circumstances                             
Operation Sophia will cooperate with Libyan coastal authorities in the future, especially in                         
respect to SAR operations. Upholding human rights standards will continue to be a major                           
challenge, as migrants intercepted by the Libyan coastguard and placed in detention face                         
grave abuses such as extortion, torture and ​sexual violence​. In light of the political crisis                             
and ​military conflict​, the ​UNHCR evacuated several refugees to Niger and called for the                           
immediate release of detained migrants. It is ​reported that migrants still trapped in Libya                           
have been shot at indiscriminately during the clashes. ​Evidence is also emerging that                         
detained migrants are being forced to take part in the Libyan armed battle. 
  
In contrast to those who ​claim that SAR operations constitute a ‘pull-factor’ for migrants,                           
t​hese reports draw the attention to the weight of ‘​push factors​’ from Libya. The incident                             
involving ​the oil tanker ​El Hiblu 1​, the details of which remain ​unclear​, ​is a case in point.                                   
Some ​media reported that migrants rescued by the ship at the end of March forced its                               
captain to change its course towards Europe, which led Italian interior minister ​Salvini to                           
describe it as an ‘​act of piracy​’. According to ​other sources​, they threatened to jump off the                                 
ship once they realised that they were heading back to Libya. As a result of the incident, a                                   
19-year-old, a 15-year-old and a 16-year-old were accused of ‘​terrorist activities​’ in Malta,                         
where the cargo vessel eventually docked. Although the incident is subject to an ongoing                           
investigation​, experts have ​pointed out that the seizure of the vessel does not constitute an                             
act of piracy under international law and that Malta may not have jurisdiction over the                             
incident. The accusation against the teenagers seems therefore especially worrying, since                     
their actions could be described as an act of ​self-defence ​against the risk of being returned                               
to Libya. ​In light of the systematic abuses which migrants are subjected to in Libya, the                               
increased support to the Libyan Coast Guard envisaged under the new mandate of                         
Operation Sophia could, ​directly or indirectly​, contribute to human right violations. In this                         
context, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has cautioned that the EU and its                             
member states should “urgently reconsider their operational support to the Libyan Coast                       
Guard”. If this call remains unanswered, Operation Sophia may be transformed into an                         
instrument of refoulement and, as experts have argued, the ​member states and the ​EU could                             
be held responsible for violating international law. This is a serious risk, considering, as                           
Secretary General of the UN ​António Guterres remarked that “no one can argue that Libya is                               
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a safe port of disembarkation” after his visit to detention centres in Tripoli in early April                               
2019. 
  
The previous mandate of Operation Sophia was neither clear nor ​widely supported​.                       
However, in the present circumstances, the suspension of the operation’s naval support is a                           
reason for ​growing concern ​as it will further weaken ​the EU’s capacity to save the lives of                                 
those migrants who find themselves in an emergency situation. Whilst the number of sea                           
crossings ​have decreased​, the rise in the number of ​fatalities recorded in recent months                           
shows that the journey across the Mediterranean is becoming ever ​more dangerous​. T​he                         
downscaling of Operation Sophia could further increase mortality rates. ​Leaked reports                     
obtained by Politico demonstrate that member states are fully aware that their policies are                           
contributing to this trend. The decision reached by member states therefore reinforces the                         
idea that European countries have come to consider it acceptable “to let people die at sea as                                 
a deterrence for migration”, as stated by​ ​Médecins Sans Frontières​.  
 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 
  EU-African cooperation on migration​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Immigration Detention ​. 
The EU and its member states are intensifying their cooperation with African countries on                           
migration control, which, as NGOs fear, may come at the ​expense of migrants’ rights. In the                               
context of Libya, a leaked ​Council Presidency note drafted in February detailed how EU                           
support for the Libyan Coast Guard has significantly contributed to reducing migrant                       
arrivals via the Central Mediterranean route. It continues to call for targeted assistance for                           
North African countries “on a much larger scale and over a longer period”, taking into                             
account the “progress achieved in Libya”. The note does not mention the worrying situation                           
of more than ​5,000 migrants in ​detention centres in Libya, which remains ​extremely                         
concerning​ (see Special Focus). 
In parallel, Spain and Morocco reached a new ​agreement in February to intensify their                           
cooperation on migration, allowing Spanish sea rescue services to take back some migrants                         
to Moroccan ports. The agreement applies to migrants who are ​intercepted during missions                         
assisting the Moroccan coast guard in Morocco’s territorial waters, and where a Moroccan                         
harbour is the nearest port of safety. The strengthened role of the Moroccan Coast Guard                             
goes hand in hand with the EU’s approval, in late 2018, of ​EUR 140 million for Moroccan                                 
border management activities. It also comes as a reaction to a ​shift in migration routes to                               
the Western Mediterranean. Meanwhile, however, civil society organisations have stressed                   
that migrants are held under ​deplorable conditions in detention centres and are unable to                           
assert their ​human rights​. In addition, ​migration experts have questioned whether                     
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cooperation between the EU and Morocco will actually be effective in reducing the number                           
of migrants on this route. 
In addition, cooperation between European and African countries on the topic of migration                         
was also the central theme of the first ​summit between the EU and League of Arab States                                 
(LAS), which took place on 24-25 February in Egypt. The meeting and its subsequent ​Sharm                             
El-Sheikh declaration included a ​focus on tackling so-called “irregular migration”,                   
smuggling and trafficking networks, and cooperation on border control. The summit was                       
hailed as a new step in EU-Arab relations by the ​European Council and the ​European                             
Parliament at a time of intensified talks on migration between the EU and North African                             
countries. Commentators have assessed the summit as part of a ​recalibration of EU ​foreign                           
policy towards ​prioritising migration management in its ​relations with non-EU countries.                     
The summit was overshadowed by a leaked African Union (AU) ​position paper​, calling on                           
African coastal states to refrain from cooperating with the EU on the so-called                         
“disembarkation platforms”. The ​concept was first introduced by the ​Council in June 2018 as                           
a way to ​disembark rescued migrants outside the EU. The proposal has already been heavily                             
scrutinised and criticised by ​civil society for its ​unfeasibility and likely ​incompatibility with                         
human right safeguards. Several ​African states also rejected the idea during the AU summit                           
in July 2018. The leaked position paper reiterates these earlier concerns and reportedly                         
raises concerns that the platforms would establish “de facto detention centres” in Africa. 
 
  The third anniversary of the EU-Turkey Deal​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Children and Youth ​.  
Three years after its conclusion, the ​EU-Turkey Statement continues to be a topic of debate.                             
The agreement, struck in March 2016, was meant to ​curb migration movements into Greece                           
and the wider Schengen area. Its main premise lies in returning all so-called “irregular                           
migrants” from the Greek islands back to Turkey and, for every Syrian returned to Turkey,                             
resettling another Syrian to an EU member state. Over the years, this one-to-one mechanism                           
has been heavily criticised, both for factually ​preventing access to asylum as well as for its                               
ineffectiveness​, as both the​ ​return​ and​ ​resettlement​ numbers of refugees remain low. 
The Statement has also led to a ​containment policy of keeping migrants in so-called                           
“hotspots” on the ​Greek islands​. In March, a ​group of 25 NGOs criticised “the endless cycle of                                 
overcrowding, substandard living conditions and extremely poor access to services” in the                       
hotspots and urged the Greek government to suspend the restriction of movement on the                           
islands. The organisations also called on European leaders to agree on fair and sustainable                           
arrangements to share the responsibility for asylum seekers arriving in Europe,                     
particularly as Greece experiences an increase in both ​asylum applications and ​sea                       
arrivals​. Similarly, ​Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) condemned a grave lack of access to                         
basic health services on the islands, in particular for vulnerable children, women, elderly                         
people and those with chronic health conditions. ​Amnesty International also urged member                       
states to transfer people from the Greek islands to the mainland and to other EU countries.                               
According to a leaked report, the European Commission has also voiced ​extensive criticism                         
of reception conditions. The chairman of the Commission’s Steering Committee for the                       
implementation of the Statement, ​Simon Mordue​, reportedly called the camp on Samos “a                         
shame for Europe”. 
Speaking at a European Policy Centre event in March, ECRE also underlined that the                           
Statement created a ​power imbalance and dependence of the EU on Turkey. In March, the                             
European Parliament voted to suspend accession talks with Turkey to become an EU                         
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member state on the basis of the deteriorating human rights situation in the country, a                             
move that was condemned by the ​Turkish government​. Following the latest meeting of the                           
EU-Turkey Association Council, however, the ​European Council underlined its interest in                     
good relations with Turkey as a candidate country and the importance of the EU-Turkey                           
Statement in “bringing irregular migration to a halt”. Yet, ​commentators have criticised                       
Turkey’s use of force in preventing migrants from crossing the border to Greece. 
 
  The removal of citizenship of suspected terrorists​. 
 ​  Mobile EU citizens​ .  
Public debate in EU member states has recently turned to the ​question of how to deal with                                 
citizens that have left Europe to join the Islamic State (IS). Member states are faced with                               
difficult decisions on whether or not to take back citizens of theirs who reached Syria and                               
Iraq to join the terrorist group, raising a number of legal, ethical and practical challenges                             
linked to security and fundamental rights. Moreover, ​international pressure is mounting to                       
repatriate such individuals. However, member states consider revoking the citizenship of                     
these persons, raising questions as to the implications for the rights conferred by EU                           
citizenship, including freedom of movement.  
Citizenship policies are generally speaking a national competence of EU member states and                         
the deprivation of citizenship falls within the scope of their state sovereignty. Accordingly,                         
Europeans can lose their nationality in a ​variety of ways, including for committing acts of                             
disloyalty or treason. In the current context, EU countries are increasingly making use of                           
the possibility to ​revoke the citizenship of those who engage in ​terrorist activities abroad,                           
thereby preventing their ​return to the state territory. A number of member states such as                             
Germany​, the​ ​Netherlands​,​ ​France​, have been exploring this possibility. 
However, international treaties limit state discretion to some extent. Notably, the European                       
Convention ​on Human Rights stipulates that individuals cannot be deprived of their right to                           
enter the territory of their state of their nationality. Deprivation of nationality may also                           
concern other rights enshrined in the same Convention, as revoking nationality may lead to                           
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment. Moreover, the 1961 UN ​Convention on the                       
Reduction of Statelessness, to which ​19 EU member states have acceded, forbids signatories                         
from depriving persons of their nationality if this would make them stateless. In addition,                           
since the acquisition and loss of nationality of an EU member state has implications for                             
European citizenship​, EU institutions have also been more closely involved in this matter in                           
recent years. Importantly, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) ​ruled that no one is to be                                   
deprived arbitrarily of his nationality and that a member state’s decision to withdraw the                           
nationality of one of its citizens must observe the principle of proportionality. Special                         
attention must be paid to the gravity of the offence committed. 
Against this background, one case that raised particular attention is that of Shamima                         
Begum, who left the UK at the age of 15 to join IS and has sought to return to the UK. Prior to                                             
that, the ​Home Secretary revoked her British citizenship on grounds of ​public security on                           
the assumption that she would not end up stateless due to her Bangladeshi second                           
nationality. The ​Bangladeshi government, however, denied that Ms Begum is a Bangladeshi                       
citizen. Before revoking her citizenship, the UK did not formally indict Ms Begum for any                             
crime. Her case therefore raises questions as to whether the UK respected the principle of                             
proportionality, as specified by the CJEU. Taking into account her current statelessness, it                         
also raises questions as to the UK’s adherence to the 1961 UN Convention. Ms Begum’s family                               
have started ​court challenges against the decision to revoke her citizenship.The case is                         
widely discussed by ​commentators who argue that the ​security rationale behind Begum’s                       
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loss of citizenship is exercised at the expense of her ​access to justice and a fair trial. Legal                                   
experts have also posited that, while Begum might have a ​legal case for Bangladeshi                           
nationality, she is ​de facto stateless​. Others are concerned that her case could further                           
accelerate the development of a ​two-tier system of citizenship which ​disfavours individuals                       
on the basis of their​ ​ethnic background​ or​ ​dual nationality​.  
 LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS 
  Agreement reached on Frontex reform​. 
 ​  Asylum ​.  
In April, the ​European Parliament approved the ​political agreement reached with the                       
Council to reform and strengthen the ​European Border and Coast Guard​, also known as                           
Frontex. Before entering into force, the text needs to be formally approved by the Council as                               
well. The ​agreed measures include a new standing corps, starting with 5,000 operational                         
staff in 2021 and becoming fully operational at 10,000 staff by 2027, which is in line with the                                   
Council’s negotiating ​position​. Moreover, it was agreed that Frontex should support return                       
procedures in member states and cooperate more closely with the EU Asylum Agency, EASO,                           
to this end. Frontex will also become more involved in cooperation with third countries                           
beyond the EU’s immediate neighbourhood, in particular by concluding status agreements                     
with third countries. These would allow Frontex to deploy border management teams and                         
conduct operations on the territory of third countries. The proposal’s initial provision to                         
grant Frontex the power to launch return interventions in third countries was deleted, as                           
proposed by ​NGOs​. The agreement was reached relatively swiftly, taking into account                       
member states’ initial ​disagreement on the ​roll-out and size of the corps, and sovereignty                           
concerns about​ ​centralising decision-making power​ with the Commission. 
Civil society organisations have expressed their concerns about the agreement and pointed                       
in particular to the growing size of the agency and the lack of human rights safeguards.                               
Commentators similarly fear that the agreement could lead to a weakening of ​protection                         
standards​, as asylum claims could increasingly be assessed by third countries not bound by                           
EU law. This ​strategy ​of externalisation has also been criticised for placing ​responsibility on                           
third countries to contain migration. ​ECRE has raised doubts as to whether the new                           
measures envisaged by the agreement will contribute to preventing, identifying and                     
remedying potential human rights violations, especially since NGOs’ proposals for revisions                     
have not been fully incorporated into the agreement. Similar concerns were also ​raised by                           
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NGOs during the ​Frontex Consultative Forum on Fundamental Rights in March. The Forum’s                         
annual report mentions several issues of concern, including in relation to the inadequacy of                           
the serious incident reporting (SIR) mechanism, and the mistreatment and ​abuse of                       
migrants at the Greek-Turkish border. Moreover, instances of ​collective expulsion from                     
Croatia to Serbia and Bosnia Herzegovina were highlighted alongside the sub-standard                     
conditions in ​reception centres in those countries. The annual report also draws attention to                           
the fact that the fundamental rights office of Frontex is understaffed and that its                           
independence is at risk, jeopardising the agency’s fundamental rights obligations. 
 
  Coordination of social security systems​. 
 ​  Mobile EU citizens​ .  
The coordination of national social security systems is a target area of the EU’s ​employment,                             
social affairs and inclusion policies. Since 2016, ​negotiations ​have been ongoing with a view                           
to reforming the ​Modernised Coordination Rules​. These rules came into force in 2010 and are                             
aimed at ensuring equal access to social security for mobile EU citizens across the Union as                               
well as a fair sharing of the costs between member states. The main objective of the current                                 
revisions is to further streamline coordination between the member states whilst                     
simultaneously combating social security fraud. In March, the European Parliament, the                     
Council and the European Commission reached a ​provisional agreement​, including a                     
standardised overview of long-term care benefits, as well as entitlement and identification                       
criteria. Moreover, the agreement encompassed new rules determining a company’s place of                       
establishment in relation to ​posted workers​. Lastly, it introduced changes concerning the                       
export and payout of unemployment benefits. However, and despite this consensus reached                       
during the trilogues, the provisional agreement was rejected by ​Coreper ​ten days later due                           
to a ​disagreement ​between the member states. This makes it unlikely that the file will be                               
completed before the end of the Romanian Council Presidency in June. In a last attempt to                               
save the progress that has been made in the previous months the Parliament voted to put                               
the file back on the ​plenary agenda of 17-18 April. However, this decision was later revoked                               
by a ​vote ​in Parliament requested by the ECR group. Therefore the first reading on this piece                                 
of legislation will now be handed over to the next Parliament. 
 
As noted by ​different commentators​, disagreement between member states on the                     
coordination of unemployment benefits proved to be the sticking point during the                       
negotiation process. First, the provisional agreement included a longer time period (six                       
months), during which unemployment benefits could be exported from the country of                       
former employment to another member state. Second, it assigned the responsibility for                       
paying unemployment benefits of both residing as well as frontier workers to the country of                             
former employment, rather than the country of residence. On the one hand, countries such                           
as ​the Netherlands and ​Belgium ​oppose the new rule package, fearing that the                         
unemployment benefit measures would lead them to bear a significant additional cost for                         
workers formerly employed in their country. On the other hand, countries such as France                           
and ​Romania ​support the new rules package, as they host a substantial number of frontier                             
workers that reside in their territories without being employed there. The new provisions                         
would take away a financial burden for these countries. ​Unedic​, the French agency                         
responsible for unemployment benefits, estimated that it would gain about €550 million to                         
€610 million extra in savings.  
 
At EU level, the provisionally agreed package originally met with positive reactions.                       
SOLIDAR ​in particular valued the new measures concerning improved access to health care,                         
regardless of an individual’s employment status. MEP ​Jean Lambert lauded the new                       
provision maintaining family benefits for dispersed families. The subsequent delay in                     
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adopting the reforms, accordingly, resulted in general disappointment. EP rapporteur for                     
the file ​Guillaume Balas ​of the S&D group expressed his frustration and urged member                           
states “to assume their responsibilities towards the 500 million European citizens”. The                       
European Trade Union Congress (​ETUC​) argued that member states had failed to protect the                           
interest of their own citizens. 
 
  Legal Migration Fitness Check​. 
  Inclusion ​.  
At the end of March, the ​Commission adopted the Fitness Check on Legal Migration, with the                               
aim of evaluating existing EU legislation in this field. The Fitness Check had started in 2016                               
and was supported by ​consultation​s with both the public and key stakeholders in member                           
states, the European institutions and ​non-governmental ​organisations and ​networks​. It                   
covers seven pieces of EU legislation on legal migration, including the Family Reunification                         
Directive, the Long-Term Residents Directive and the EU Blue Card Directive. The ​Fitness                         
Check found that, while national systems for legal migration were brought into line to some                             
extent, a degree of incoherence between legal migration directives prevails and is                       
exacerbated by different national implementation choices. Moreover, it presented mixed                   
results in terms of the effectiveness of the legal migration acquis. The fitness check also                             
made note of a generally positive impact on the level of rights of third country nationals                               
and on the protection of family life. However, the integration of third country nationals and                             
the prevention of labour exploitation were found to be lacking. The Commission is now                           
holding further consultations and welcomes feedback from civil society organisations. 
 SELECTED ECJ CASE LAW & LEGAL ACTIONS 
  
 ​  Asylum ​.​  ​ ​  Mobile EU citizens​ .​  ​  Children and Youth ​. 
Case ​C-163/17 Jawo and Joined Cases ​C-297/17​, C-318/17 Ibrahim, C-319/17 Sharqawi and                       
Others and C-438/17 Magamadov, 19 March 2019 
The Jawo case concerned the expulsion of an asylum seeker under the Dublin Regulation.                           
After lodging an application for asylum in Italy, Mr Jawo submitted another application in                           
Germany. He appealed the decision to return him to Italy, the state normally responsible for                             
his application, claiming that living conditions there would lead to a violation of his human                             
rights. In this context, the CJEU was asked to clarify if the expulsion of an asylum seeker to                                   
another member state is inadmissible if it exposed him/her to a substantial risk of inhuman                             
or degrading treatment. The case was combined with the joined cases of Ibrahim, Sharqawi                           
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and Others, and Magamadov, where the admissibility of a removal was questioned by                         
beneficiaries of subsidiary protection on the same grounds. In its ruling, the Court stressed                           
the importance of the principle of mutual trust which requires member states to presume                           
that all other members comply with their human rights obligations. However, it also added                           
that, in a situation where member states experience systemic deficiencies, there may be a                           
risk that asylum seekers and beneficiaries of international protection are treated in a                         
manner which is incompatible with their human rights. This finding, which is generally                         
consistent with the Court’s landmark ​N.S. ruling​, is especially relevant given recent ​reports                         
revealing that Dublin returnees continue to be at serious risk of material destitution. In                           
Jawo, however, and different from the earlier N.S. ​ruling, the CJEU also specified that such                             
deficiencies would only amount to inhuman or degrading treatment when they are                       
particularly severe, for instance where the person concerned finds himself in a situation of                           
extreme material poverty that does not allow him to meet his most basic needs. Given this                               
high bar, ​commentators have warned that the judgment could clear the way for states to                             
send back refugees to EU countries with poor living conditions. The CJEU nevertheless                         
emphasised that, if a decision to transfer is challenged, national courts are obliged to                           
examine in detail the circumstances of the case to establish whether the person concerned                           
might not end up being subjected to degrading treatment. The ​same obligation ​also applies,                           
as in the cases of Ibrahim and Others, and Magamadov, to those who already benefit from                               
protection and subsequently file an asylum application in a second member state. 
Case​ ​C-221/17​ Tjebbes and Others v Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, 12 March 2019 
Tjebbes concerned the situation of four Dutch nationals who also possessed the nationality                         
of a non-EU country. In line with Dutch citizenship rules, they were faced with the loss of                                 
their Dutch nationality after having resided outside of the Netherlands and the EU for a                             
period of 10 years or more. In this context, questions were raised before the EU Court of                                 
Justice on whether the Dutch citizenship rules at issue were compatible with EU Treaty                           
provisions on EU citizenship, given that the loss of Dutch nationality entailed a concurrent                           
loss of EU citizenship. The Court considered that the Dutch criterion of an uninterrupted                           
period of 10 years outside the EU as a ground for losing citizenship was in principle                               
legitimate, and therefore not precluded under EU law. However, those rules would be                         
incompatible with EU law if they would not permit, for each person concerned, an individual                             
examination of the consequences of that loss. The Court highlighted several elements to be                           
considered in the context of such examinations. First, due regard was to be had for the                               
consequences of such a loss on the development of a person’s family and professional life. In                               
this context, the rights guaranteed by the EU ​Charter of Fundamental Rights were of                           
relevance, particularly the right to family life and the best interests of the child.                           
Furthermore, ensuing limitations on the exercise to free movement rights as well as the                           
impossibility of enjoying consular protection under Article 20(2) TFEU would need to be                         
taken into account as well. This judgment follows up on earlier CJEU case law on the                               
interaction between national citizenship law and Treaty provisions on EU citizenship,                     
particularly the 2010 ​Rottmann ​ruling. Tjebbes generally expands on Rottmann ​by                     
re-confirming that national discretion to regulate the loss of nationality is ​limited by                         
minimum standards and requirements attaching to EU citizenship. 
Case​ ​C-129/18​ SM v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section, 26 March 2019 
This case concerned an application for entry clearance for a child, SM, placed in Algeria                             
under the Islamic kafala which, broadly speaking, constitutes a guardianship system. The                       
application was made by two spouses of French nationality resident in the United Kingdom.                           
The Entry Clearance Officer rejected the application on the ground that the kafala cannot be                             
recognised as adoption. After several unsuccessful appeals, the case reached the UK                       
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Supreme Court. In its reference to the CJEU, the British apex court asked whether a child                               
who is under a kafala guardianship arrangement with an EU citizen classifies as ‘direct                           
descendant’ for the purpose of ​the ‘​Citizens’ Rights Directive​’. If so, the child would enjoy an                               
automatic right of entry and residence in the UK. The CJEU found that the kafala system                               
does not create a parent-child relationship and that the child did not, therefore, be qualify                             
as a direct descendant. Unlike adoption, a child under kafala does not become the guardian’s                             
heir. Algerian law itself does not equate kafala to adoption, the latter being prohibited in                             
Islamic law​. Nevertheless, the CJEU did hold that a child under a legal guardianship system                             
such as the kafala falls under the definition of ‘other family members’ referred to in the                               
Directive. As such, member states must give a child placed under kafala access to facilitated                             
entry and residence, subject to a balanced and reasonable assessment of the circumstances                         
of the case. Where the bond between the child and the guardian(s) is genuine, the Court                               
maintained, respect for family life and the protection of a child’s best interests demand that                             
the right of entry and residence is granted​. 
Other relevant case law 
Case​ ​C‑635/17​ E. v Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, 13 March 2019 
Case​ ​C-557/17​ Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie v Y.Z. and Others, 14 March 2019 
Case​ ​C-372/18​ Ministre de l'Action v Mr and Mrs Raymond Dreyer, 14 March 2019 
Case​ ​C-444/17​ Préfet des Pyrénées-Orientales v Abdelaziz Arib, 19 March 2019 
Case​ ​C‑483/17​, Neculai Tarola v Minister for Social Protection, 11 April 2019 
 A CLOSER LOOK FROM... 
  ​The #YourVoteOurFuture Campaign​. 
  Inclusion ​.​  ​ ​  Asylum ​.  
By Villads Zahle, European Council on Refugees and Exiles (​ECRE​) 
The key challenge for anyone who opposes the current political meltdown on migration and                           
asylum policies is the fact that the European debate is derailed by misconceptions. Its                           
rationale is a self-feeding circle of myths: the number of migrants and refugees arriving in                             
Europe constitute a serious crisis! European populations are extremely worried! Politicians                     
at EU and national level are forced to prevent access! Any measure can be justified…                             
Because we are in a crisis! 
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By allowing the populist far-right to frame the debate more or less unchallenged, defeatist                           
European politicians have turned a perfectly manageable situation into a full-blown and                       
self-inflicted political crisis that now functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The                     
consequences are visible along the Eastern and Southern European borders, on the                       
Mediterranean, in Libya and in Europe, where EU solidarity and cooperation is seriously                         
challenged, where a race to the bottom rages across member states, and deportations to                           
conflict areas are accepted. This is of course not a crisis that can be solved in a single                                   
campaign but the European Parliament (EP) elections nonetheless provide a potential for                       
change, and we at ECRE  believed that we had to act. 
We are doing so on two levels, with two campaigns running simultaneously aimed at two                             
different target audiences: one the one hand, we devised an advocacy campaign with the                           
intention to directly influence the political manifestos of the EP groups and political parties                           
at the national level, mobilising the ECRE membership and assisting them in their respective                           
countries. On the other hand, we launched a public campaign on social media with the                             
hashtag #YourVoteOurFuture featuring three ​key messages​: 1. We are the majority: ​public                       
opinion studies across Europe consistently reveal that hostility towards migrants and                     
refugees is a minority phenomenon; 2. We can win: recent ​polls suggest that it is possible to                                 
mobilise more Europeans to vote and have a parliament pushing for policies that are more                             
in tune with the values of the majority; 3. A win will change policies: the European                               
Parliament has the power to provide change and the history to prove it. 
We saw two main challenges related to the distribution and impact of those messages: the                             
dilemma that many on the progressive left are sceptical towards the EU as an institution                             
and therefore less likely to vote. And the paradox that the people of refugee and migrant                               
background, while used as scapegoats and targeted by harsh policies, are rarely heard in                           
the debate. However, the impressive counteractions since the defining year of 2015-16 from                         
‘old’ and ‘new Europeans’ working together at grassroot level had already proved extremely                         
potent. The voices delivering the campaign messages of the #YourVoteOurFuture campaign                     
belong to refugee advocates and refugee-led organisations. The target audience are the                       
progressive Europeans who are already engaged in the work for and with refugees and                           
migrants. It all came together with the support for a workshop prior to the launch of the                                 
campaign in early February, when a campaign coordination group was founded with ECRE                         
and campaign partners from the membership and beyond. The campaign ​material features                       
individual refugee advocates as well as campaign statements urging Europeans to “Vote for                         
a Europe” that is open, progressive and respectful – the Europe representing a strong and                             
optimistic alternative to the far-right dystopia. A Europe worth voting for! 
 FACTS & FIGURES 
      
 UNHCR statistics on arrivals​. 
  Asylum ​. 
Recent data by the UNHCR​ ​reveal​ the following trends: 
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● 13,540 sea arrivals have been recorded since the beginning of the year. 647 have arrived in                               
Italy, while 6,313 have arrived in Greece and 6,318 have arrived in Spain; 
● So far, an estimated 402 people have been reported dead or missing in 2019; 
● In Italy, the majority of refugees come from Tunisia, Algeria and Iraq, while more than half                               
of all refugees arriving in Greece originate from Afghanistan and Iraq. In Spain, the                           
majority of refugees come from Guinea, Morocco and Mali. 
  Relevant reports​. 
  Asylum ​.​ ​  Inclusion ​.​  ​  Immigration Detention ​.   
 
Amnesty International: Pushed to the edge 
In this ​report ​Amnesty International focuses on human rights violations committed along                       
the Western Balkans route, specifically in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia.                       
Research was carried out between June 2018 and January 2019. At the Croatian-Bosnia and                           
Herzegovinian border both systemic and deliberate push-backs as well as collective                     
expulsions, sometimes accompanied with violence and intimidation, were found to be                     
occurring regularly. The report calls on the EU leadership to take measures to prevent a new                               
humanitarian crisis and on member states to stop collective expulsions.  
OECD:  Building an EU Talent Pool: A New Approach to Migration Management for Europe 
This ​report ​provides the results of OECD research on labour migration policies within the                           
EU. It offers an overview of the strategies used to attract and recruit skilled third country                               
nationals to the EU, as well as the hurdles they face, including frictions and imperfections in                               
the international job matching process.  
EPIM: Mainstreamed or overlooked? Migrant inclusion and social cohesion in the European                       
Social Fund 
The next long-term EU budget (MFF) includes a proposal to replace the current European                           
Social Fund (ESF). ​This study evaluates both issues and good practices related to the current                             
ESF, in order to identify what added value the new European Social Fund plus (ESF+) could                               
potentially hold for migrant inclusion and social cohesion. 
 
  EU Funding opportunities​. 
  Inclusion ​.​  ​  Asylum ​.​  ​  Children and Youth ​. 
Calls for proposals - EU funding 
● REC-RCHI-PROF-AG-2019​: Call for proposals on capacity-building in the area of rights of the                         
child and child-friendly justice 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 15.01.2019 – Deadline: 14.05.2019 
● REC-RDAP-GBV-AG-2019: Call for proposals to prevent and combat all forms of violence                       
against children, young people and women 
o​  ​ ​Call out on 15.01.2019 – Deadline: 13.06.2019 
● REC-RDIS-DISC-AG-2019​: Call for proposals to promote the effective implementation of the                     
principle of non-discrimination 
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o​  ​ ​Call out on 13.12.2018 – Deadline: 20.06.2019 
Other opportunities 
From Tampere 20 to Tampere 2.0: ​Call for Contributions;​ Deadline 10.05.2019 
EPIM:​ ​A Future for Migrant Children and Youth in Greece​; Deadline 13.05.2019 
Forced Migration Review:​ ​Call for Contributions​; Deadline 17.06.2019 
 EU CALENDAR: UPCOMING EVENTS 
 
European Council and Council of the European Union 
  9 May  European Council - informal meeting in Sibiu 
  6-7 June  JHA Council 
European Parliament 
  23-26 May  European Parliament Elections 
Other events 
  2 May 
Implementation of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and 
Regular Migration​, the European Economic and Social Committee 
  4-5 May 
European Summit of Refugees and Migrants​, Global Refugee-Led 
Network   
  7 May 
Europe’s Turning Point on Migration? Politics, Policy and               
Predictions Ahead of the 2019 Elections​, Migration Policy Centre  
  23-24 May 
Migration between Africa and Europe: Knowledge Production,             
Attitudes, and Governance​, Migration Policy Centre   
  26-28 June 
2019 World Conference on Statelessness and Inclusion 
  1-12 July 
Summer School on EU Immigration and Asylum Law​,​ Odysseus 
  3-5 July 
NGO consultations​, UNHCR  
 
This document provides a focused analysis of recent EU level policy-making, legislation and jurisprudence                           
relevant to EPIM’s sub-funds on (1) Immigration detention; (2) Reforming the European Asylum System;                           
(3) Children and Youth on the Move; (4) Mobile EU citizens and (5) Building Inclusive European Societies and                                 
covers the period from 25 February to 24 April 2019. We kindly ask the readers to keep in mind that the present                                           
Policy Update is composed of a selection of documents and does not claim to be exhaustive. 
Should you, as representatives from EPIM’s Partner Foundations or EPIM-supported organisations, have                       
questions related to the analysis provided in this document or on EU developments in the field of migration                                   
and integration in general, you are invited to contact the authors ( ​k.bamberg@epc.eu ​, ​ah.neidhardt@epc.eu​,                         
m.desomer@epc.eu ​, ​i.vanbrouwershaven@epc.eu ​). The sole responsibility for the content lies with the                     
author(s) and the content may not necessarily reflect the positions of EPIM, NEF or EPIM’s Partner                               
Foundations. 
For more information on EPIM, please visit ​www.epim.info ​. 
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